Quantum qualia..

 how do synchronized neural firings and synaptic transmissions produce experiential qualia, emotions or free will? Physicalists believe this to be relatively straightforward (brain = mind = computer) however others find the question intractable, or as vexing as trying to coax a reluctant genie from a magic lamp. I see three problems with the brain = mind = computer analogy:

1. Is consciousness classical computation? In a controversial stance Roger Penrose ^1-3 has asserted that essential aspects of consciousness are non-computable. But regardless, classical computers appear to be evolving toward quantum computers. Beginning in the early 1980's Benioff, Feynman and others proposed that states in a system - bits in a computer - could interact while in quantum superposition of all possible states, effecting near-infinite parallel computation. Rather than classical Boolean bit states 1 or 0, quantum computers would utilize interactive "qubits" of 1 and 0. If quantum computers can ever be constructed they will have huge advantages in important applications. As the brain/mind has always been cast as current information technology, consciousness may inevitably be seen as some form of quantum computation.

2. Are neural firings the "fine grain" of consciousness? Cells and synapses are far more complex than simple on­off switches. Consider the paramecium, a single cell organism which gracefully swims, avoids predators, learns to escape from capillary tubes, and finds food and mates. Observing intelligent behavior in unicellular creatures C.S. Sherrington said in 1951: "Of nerve there is no trace. But the cell framework, the cyto-skeleton, might serve." Lacking synapses, paramecium utilizes its cytoskeleton for communication and organization. Neurons have a rich and dynamic set of cytoskeletal microtubules which regulates synapses, and tremendously increases potential computational capacity (e.g. 10¹⁶ bit states/second/neuron)⁴. More importantly, neurons are alive and we don't yet know what that implies for consciousness.

3. Details which don't fit the brain = mind = computer scheme are overlooked.

For example:

1. Neurotransmitter vesicle release and cognitive reaction times are "noisy", and exhibit apparent probabilistic randomness (?non­computable quantum indeterminacy⁵).
2. Axonal firing patterns (rather than average frequency) and dendritic­dendritic processing may be relevant to consciousness⁶.
3. Apart from chemical synapses, primitive electrotonic gap junctions couple neurons and glia synchronously and may play an important role in consciousness.
4. Glial cells (80% of the brain) are ignored in the brain­as­computer view.

Quibbling aside, the physicalist view fails to address difficult issues. For example the problem of 'binding' in vision and self is often attributed to temporal correlation (e.g. coherent 40 Hz), but it is unclear why temporal correlation per se should bind experience without an explanation of experience. Regarding transition from pre­conscious or implicit processing to consciousness itself, the physicalist view sees emergence at a critical level of neural-level computational complexity. But no conscious threshold is apparent, nor is there a reasonable suggestion why such an emergent property should have conscious experience. As physicalism is based on deterministic computation, it is also unable to account for free will or Penrose's proposed non­computability. But the major problem remains experience, for which physicalism offers no testable predictions. Something is missing.